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“….the only thing we have to fear is fear itself”
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1933
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Fearsome risks are those that stimulate strong emotional responses. Such risks, which
usually involve high consequences, tend to have low probabilities, since life today is no
longer nasty, brutish and short. In the face of a low-probability fearsome risk, people
often exaggerate the benefits of preventive, risk-reducing, or ameliorative measures. In
both personal life and politics, the result is damaging overreactions to risks. We offer
evidence for the phenomenon of probability neglect, failing to distinguish between high
and low-probability risks. Action bias is a likely result.

1. The problem and the Thesis
When risks threaten, some cognitive mechanisms push people toward action; others push
them toward inaction. The availability heuristic can do either. When relevant events are
cognitively available, people will be inclined to act; availability bias might lead them to value the
risk excessively and thereby take excessive precautions. But if relevant events are not available,
the unavailability bias will predominate. The risk will be slighted, and action will be inhibited.
Most of the literature on individual and social responses to risks stresses the inaction
case, and focuses on the need to develop mechanisms to ensure that serious dangers receive
sufficient response. President Roosevelt’s concerns about fear, expressed in his very next words,
were: “nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat
into advance.” Roosevelt was right to see that this “paralysis” phenomenon is important. But
because cognitive biases also push in the opposite direction, producing overreactions or what we

might think of as panic, mechanisms are also needed to dampen public demands and policy
responses. Panic and passivity are the opposite ends of a spectrum. Each is unwelcome.
This essay focuses on fearsome risks—those that stimulate strong emotional responses,
such as fear and anxiety.1 Such risks, which usually involve high consequences, tend to have
extremely low probabilities, since life today is no longer nasty, brutish and short. We aim to
show here that in the face of a fearsome risk, people often exaggerate the benefits of preventive,
risk-reducing, or ameliorative measures. In both personal life and politics, the result is damaging
overreactions to risks. In this essay, we focus on a form of decision bias that goes by the name of
probability neglect.
Probabilities perplex people. Puny probabilities prove particularly perplexing. When risk
probabilities are extremely low, as they are for most high-consequence negative events, those
who fall victim to probability neglect will give up too much to avoid the risk. Frequently, they
will take excessive preventive action.2 This will be true of governments and corporations as well
as individuals, in part because they respond to individuals, in part because of their own
tendencies.
One salient manifestation of probability neglect is that in two situations involving the
same fearsome risk, one much more likely than the other, individuals may value risk elimination
little differently even though probabilities may differ by a factor of 20 or more. The reason is that
they focus on the bad outcome itself, and they are inattentive to the question of how likely it is to
occur—hence their overreaction when the risk is low. Such overreactions in general can be
categorized as “action bias.” That bias is especially likely if the relevant actors will be able to
obtain credit for responding to the risk. That credit may come from themselves or from the
public more generally (Patt and Zeckhauser, 2000).
An understanding of action bias in the context of low-probability risks, and its common
ingredient probability neglect, has important implications for both law and policy. It is
predictable that in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, the public will both alter its behavior and
demand a substantial governmental response. That will be true even if the magnitude of the risk
does not warrant such a response, and even if the danger is far less than that presented by other
hazards that do not greatly concern people, perhaps because they do not get much public
attention. Consider, for example, the possibility that extensive security precautions at airports
will lead people to drive rather than to fly; because flying is much safer than driving, such
precautions might sacrifice many lives on balance. The monies spent in recent years on airplane
security might be out of scale with the level of risk reduction produced, particularly since
numerous tests have found that the screening routinely fails to find weapons.
Perhaps such screening, however low the risk or ineffective the preventive, does fulfill
the function of reassuring the public. If so, it serves a positive function, not unlike the nighttime
hoof clops of mounted police. Squad cars may be better at deterring or catching criminals, but do
1

The “risk as feelings” hypothesis highlights the “role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making,”
(Loewenstein et al, 2001, p. 267), as opposed to a cognitive assessment of a risk.
2
The converse is surely true. If emotions lead to the neglect of probabilities, there will be insufficient response to
high probability risks.
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much less to reduce public anxiety. Hoof clops are splendid as a fear placebo. The same points
apply of course to many other purported forms of risk reduction, including measures to prevent
financial crises, local steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and regulation of abandoned
hazardous waste dumps. Financial crises have a distinctive element: fear-related emotions
themselves may stimulate the crisis, as in 2008, making reassurance that much more critical.
In the personal as opposed to social domain, we can find many analogues, as when
people alter their travel plans to avoid slight risks of crime, restructure their portfolios to avoid
small risks of big financial losses, or change their diet to avoid de minimis health risks. In all of
these cases, a form of action bias, fueled by probability neglect, may lead to overreactions. The
costs of overreaction may be financial (restructuring the portfolio), increased risk (driving rather
than flying), or sacrificed pleasure (children foregoing Halloween due to extremely rare razorblade incidents).
2. Demonstrating Probability Neglect
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) tells us that the perceived benefits of risk
elimination will be much less than proportional to the risk avoided, since the probability
weighting function takes a downward leap at 0. However, prospect theory alone gives no
indication that the ratio of valuations would change dramatically with the nature of a risk, or with
how it was described.
Experiments on probability neglect seek to assess whether attention to probability could
be overshadowed by attention to the affective goodness or badness of the outcome, quite
contrary to what leading theories of decision making posit. To make the same point in broader
and more metaphorical terms, emotional activity dampens cognitive activity. Loewenstein and
Lerner (2003) observe that: “As the intensity of immediate emotions intensifies, they
progressively take control of decision making and override rational decision making.” We would
expand this assertion to include overriding well-documented behavioral patterns in decision
making, such as those described by prospect theory. If such overshadowing or “taking control” is
found, then a dire risk could swamp or at least temper the importance of dramatic probability
differences.
Some of the relevant experiments explore whether varying the probability of harm would
matter less in settings that trigger strong emotions than in those that are relatively emotion-free.
One such study explored people’s willingness to pay to avoid electric shocks, in an effort to test
the relevance of variations in probability to “affect rich” decisions (Rottenstreich and Hsee,
2001). In the “strong emotion” setting, participants were asked to imagine that they would
participate in an experiment involving some chance of a “short, painful, but not dangerous
electric shock.” In the relatively emotion-free setting, they were told that the experiment entailed
some chance of a $20 penalty. Participants were asked to say how much they would be willing to
pay to avoid participating in the relevant experiment. Some participants were told that there was
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a 1% chance of receiving the bad outcome (either the $20 loss or the electric shock); others were
told that the chance was 99%.
The central result was that variations in probability affected those facing the relatively
emotion-free injury, the $20 penalty, far more than they affected people facing the more
emotionally evocative outcome of an electric shock. For the cash penalty, the difference between
the median payment for a 1% chance and the median payment for a 99% chance was predictably
large. The median subject paid $1 to avoid a 1% chance, and $18 to avoid a 99% chance. For the
electric shock, by contrast, the difference in probability made little difference to median
willingness to pay: $7 to avoid a 1% chance, and $10 to avoid a 99% chance—only 1½ as much
in the affect-rich setting as opposed to 18 times as much when little emotion was involved. (Of
course, a fully rational response would produce a ratio much greater than 18, since income
effects are likely trivial for such small gambles.)
The conclusion is that when a hazard stirs strong emotions, most people will pay an
amount to avoid it that varies little even with extreme differences in the starting probability.
What we are stressing here is that when the probability of loss is very low, people will show
action bias. They will favor precautionary steps even if those steps are not justified by any
plausible analysis of expected utility.
For either social or personal risks, the implication is clear. When the potential loss is
likely to trigger strong emotions, action bias threatens, as it does when the loss is an economic
meltdown, environmental catastrophe, terrorist attack, contracting cancer, or getting killed in a
plane crash. Even if the likelihood of a terrible outcome were extremely low, people would be
willing to pay a great deal to avoid it, whether through public or private action. Once a risk is in
people’s minds, their willingness to pay to avoid it will often be relatively impervious to
significant changes in probability. The significant and often expensive precautions taken against
possible sniper attacks by citizens of the Washington, DC area in October 2002 provide a
dramatic example; they attest to the phenomenon of probability neglect in the face of a vivid
threat. Indeed, some of these precautions, such as driving great distances to a gas station in
Virginia, almost certainly increased mortality risks on balance.3
Probability neglect and hence action bias can be found for willingness to reduce, and not
merely to eliminate, a risk. To be sure, prospect theory shows that people will pay a special
premium to eliminate a risk, but where the risk is emotionally gripping, risk reduction will not be
sensitive to the question of probability. To investigate the possibility of value inflation in
response to risks, we asked a large number of law students to state their maximum willingness to
pay to reduce levels of arsenic in drinking water. The questions were drawn from real life. They
were based on actual choices recently confronting the Environmental Protection Agency,
involving cost and benefit information within the ballpark of actual figures used by the agency
itself.
3

When the risk is imposed by malicious people, there is often a negative externality from the precautions taken by
any individual. Those who went to Virginia to fill made it more dangerous for D.C. fillers. When few citizens walk
in an urban area at night, those who still walk find such activity more dangerous.
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Participants were randomly sorted into four groups, representing the four conditions in a
2x2 experiment, where both the probability and the description of the risk varied. In the first
condition, people were asked to state their maximum willingness to pay to eliminate a cancer risk
of one in 1,000,000. In the second condition, people were asked to state their maximum
willingness to pay to eliminate a cancer risk of one in 100,000. In the third condition, people
were asked the first question, but the cancer was described in vivid terms, as “very gruesome and
intensely painful, as the cancer eats away at the internal organs of the body.” In the fourth
condition, people were asked the second question, but the cancer was described in the same vivid
terms as in the third condition. In each condition, participants were asked to check off their
willingness to pay among the following options: $0, $25, $50, $100, $200, $400, and $800 or
more. Notice that the description of the cancer in the “highly emotional” conditions added little
information, simply describing many cancer deaths, though admittedly some participants might
well have learned that these were especially horrific deaths.4
The first hypothesis, consistent with the probability weighting function of prospect
theory, was that the ten-fold difference in probabilities—between 1/100,000 and 1/1,000,000—
would generate a much less than a ten-fold difference in willingness to pay. The second
hypothesis was that the probability variations would matter less in the highly emotional
conditions than in the less emotional conditions. More specifically, it was predicted that the
highly emotional conditions would overshadow differences in probability, whereas such
differences would have greater importance in the less emotional condition.
Here are the results in tabular form:
Table 1. Willingness to Pay in Dollars for Elimination of Arsenic Risks
Harvard Law School Results, 2008
Mean (Median)
[Number of Subjects]
Probability

Unemotional Description

Emotional Description

1/100,000

241.25 (100)
[20]

250 (100)
[13]

1/1,000,000

59.21 (25)
[19]

211.67 (200)
[15]

The study was conducted in two law school venues, University of Chicago (Sunstein,
2002) and at Harvard Law School. At Chicago, the medians were 25 and 100 for the unemotional
description, and 100 and 100 for the emotional description. While the sample size was too small
to permit firm conclusions, the qualitative results pointed in the hypothesized direction. The
emotional description drove out responses to the quantitative difference in the risk.

4

Paul Slovic stressed to us that individuals cannot experience fear over a sustained period of time. However, we
believe that our questions spotlight a risk, and do have the potential to stir severe emotions as individuals respond.

5

At Harvard, as shown and hypothesized, the valuations for the emotional description
hardly differed even though risks differed by a factor of 10. There was substantial difference in
willingness to pay (WTP) for the unemotional description. A Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon Rank
Sum test showed that the WTP was actually higher for the 1/1,000,000 risk given the emotional
description, though far from significant. By contrast, and as expected, the difference for the
emotional description was highly significant, with the 1/100,000 payment higher (z = 3.398, p <
0.001). Comparing the two results showed that the unemotional description gave a greater
differential that was highly statistically significant.
It is important to note that the difference in WTP, even for the unemotional description,
was far below the 10 to 1 odds ratio; for means it was roughly 4 to 1. Both hypotheses were
therefore supported. First, varying the probability had an effect on WTP that was much less than
rational decision theory would predict. (Future research should assess whether even mentioning
the word “cancer” induced sufficient emotion to reduce a 10 to 1 ratio to 4 to 1.) Second, the
effect of increasing the probability by a factor of ten had an effect that was highly significant in
the unemotional condition—but was completely insignificant in the emotional condition. When
the cancer was described in affectively gripping terms, people were insensitive to probability
variations.
These findings have two implications for overreactions. They suggest, first, that when
extremely low probability risks give rise to intense fear, they are likely to trigger a larger
behavioral response than do statistically identical comparisons involving less fearsome risks.
Here, as in the experiment, there will be a kind of “emotion premium.” The findings suggest,
second, that probability neglect will play a role in the private and public reaction to emotionally
gripping risks, and that many people will focus, much of the time, on the emotionally perceived
severity of the outcome, rather than on its likelihood. In this light, it should not be surprising that
our public figures and our cause advocates often describe tragic outcomes. Rarely do we here
them quote probabilities. The latter, even if reasonably large, would have little salience in the
public debate.
Think of an anti-drunk driving campaign that said: “When you drink don’t drive; you
have one chance in 1,000,000 of getting into a fatal car crash, a much higher probability than
most people believe.”5 The alternative campaign, catering to probability neglect, would skip
probabilities altogether. It might show a car wrapped around a tree, and a grieving family
standing nearby, with the simple statement: “When you drink don’t drive.” The tree-wrap, we
predict, would be more effective.
Emotions not connected to fear may also drive probability neglect. Consider outrage, an
emotion sometimes stirred when low probability risks are created from the outside, as they are
with nuclear waste radiation. A similar risk from radon exposure comes from one’s own
basement, hence no outrage. Outrage can overshadow probabilities in much the same way as a
vivid risk can, reinforcing our metaphor about emotional activity dampening cognitive activity.
5

This number was roughly calculated assuming that there are 100 million drivers, each driving after drinking 15
days a year, and accounting for half the annual fatalities in the United States.
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A central finding of relevant empirical work is consistent with that stressed here: a large
difference in probability had no effect on people’s judgments in a “high outrage” condition,
involving nuclear waste, but a significant effect in a “low outrage” condition, involving radon.
For nuclear waste, people responded the same way to a risk of 1 in 100,000 as to a risk of 1 in
1,000,000 (Sandman et al., 1998). Even when both the statistical risk and ultimate consequences
were identical in the high outrage (nuclear waste) and low outrage (radon) cases, people in the
nuclear waste case reported a much greater perceived threat and a much higher intention to act to
reduce that threat (id.). Indeed, “the effect of outrage was practically as large as the effect of a
4000-fold difference in risk between the high-risk and low-risk conditions” (id.).6
In this light, it is not surprising that visualization or imagery matters a great deal to
people’s reactions to risks. Vivid images can produce palpable overreactions (Slovic et al.,
2000). When an image of a bad outcome is easily accessible, people will become greatly
concerned about a risk, holding probability constant (Loewenstein et al., 2001). An interesting
anomaly is that when people are asked how much they will pay for flight insurance for losses
resulting from “terrorism,” they will pay more than if they are asked how much they will pay for
flight insurance from all causes (Johnson et al., 1993).7 The likely explanation for this peculiar
result is that the word “terrorism” evokes vivid images of disaster, outrage, or both, thus
inhibiting judgments about probability differences. Note also that when people discuss a lowprobability risk, their concern rises even if the discussion consists mostly of apparently
trustworthy assurances that the likelihood of harm really is infinitesimal (Alkahami and Slovic,
1994). The discussion helps people to visualize the risk, thus making it more frightening. The
most sensible conclusion is that with respect to risks of injury or harm, vivid images and
concrete pictures of disaster can “crowd out” the cognitive activity require to conclude and
consider the fact that the probability of disaster is really small.
3. Probability Neglect and Anxiety
We also sought to test the relationship between probability neglect and the emotion of
anxiety. In order to do so, we followed Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001), who used a painful but
not dangerous electric shock to produce emotion and presumably anxiety. In a subsequent class,
the authors asked the same class of Harvard Law School students how much they would demand
to accept a shock. If their demand price was below the experimenter’s payment price, the
experiment would go ahead at the experimenter’s price, thus assuring incentive compatibility.
6

An alternative explanation is that individuals demand substantial compensation for their outrage, and that such
compensation is both fairly independent of the probability and large relative to the compensation for risk. Note that
efforts to communicate the meaning of differences in risk levels, by showing comparisons to normal risk levels,
reduced the effect of outrage; but only modestly so. Outrage had nearly the same effect as a 2000-fold increase in
risk (id.). Did this information provision improve cognitive uptake directly, or indirectly because it dampened the
outrage? Further experiments will be required to tell.
7
This should bring to mind a component of the embeddedness phenomenon known for contingent valuation. If seals
are appealing and easily visualized, it is not surprising that we might pay more to save them in an oil spill than to
save all wildlife.
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This too was a 2x2 setup, with the probability and the timing of the shock each taking two
values. The shock was either received for certain (100% probability) or with 1% probability. The
shock was to be delivered immediately after class, or immediately after a class one year from the
experiment. Unlike the arsenic study, the categories of payment were not predefined. Not
surprisingly, the mean values substantially exceeded the medians due to a few severe outliers.
It was conjectured that contemplating receiving the shock in a year would raise anxiety
beyond that of waiting to receive a potential shock at the end of class. Such anxiety, it was
thought, might enhance probability neglect. It could also raise the demand price.
There were three hypotheses to be tested. They would be tested using rank order,
nonparametric methods.
1. Subjects would show probability neglect. The differences in demand prices in the
certainty condition and 1% chance condition would be far less than 100 to 1.
2. The contemplation period for receiving a shock in a year would increase the total costs
of anxiety. Because people would want to reduce their own anxiety, the demand price would be
higher for the shock to be delivered a year from today.
If hypothesis 2 was confirmed, a third hypothesis would be relevant.
3. Given that probability neglect is greater in emotionally gripping cases, the disparity
between the certainty price and the 1% price would be more compressed for the shock to be
received in a year (thus multiplying anxiety) that from the shock to be received today.
The results were as follows:
Table 2. Demand Price to Accept a Painful but Nondangerous Electric Shock
Harvard Law School Results, 2008
Mean (Median)
[Number of Subjects]
Probability

Shock Today

Shock in a Year (Anxiety)

100%

1283.33 (50)
[12]

1966.43 (100)
[14]

1%

661.41 (50)
[23]

824.05 (50)
[21]

The first hypothesis, most important to our central claim here, was confirmed. There was
nothing even close to a statistically significant difference between the certainty price and 1%
conditions in both the Shock Today and Shock in a Year cases. Despite a 100 times greater
chance of getting a shock, people demanded to be paid no more to receive it.8
The second hypothesis was rejected. Moreover, there was not close to statistical
significance in the difference between the price in a year and the price today for either
8

The contrast with the Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) results is instructive. Their study differed in two significant
ways: (1) They asked willingness-to-pay rather than willingness-to-accept. They got much lower median values,
namely $7 and $19.86. (They also tried a median of $10 for a 99% chance of a shock.) (2) They did not use an
incentive-compatible procedure. Hence, their values may be low for strategic reasons.
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probability. This rendered the third hypothesis moot; moreover, no statistically significant
difference was found in either direction.
What explains the rejection of the second hypothesis? It is conceivable that the mere
thought of a shock is sufficient to induce an emotional state, and that in light of that thought,
subjects were not influenced by either time lapses or by probability. Note that standard theory
might predict that people would discount the future and hence be more willing to pay to avoid an
imminent shock than a future one; though we hypothesized the opposite, it is noteworthy that
there was no discounting of an adverse event in the future. It is also possible that although
anxiety induces emotion directly, anxiety about anxiety is much less powerful. That is,
individuals may have a difficult time thinking about their loss from being anxious. Future
experiments might examine the role of anxiety as an emotion-inducing experience in the period
before an unfavorable lottery is resolved.

4. The Demand for and Supply of Law
If probability neglect characterizes individual judgment under certain circumstances,
government and law are likely to be neglecting probability under those same circumstances. If
people show unusually strong reactions to low-probability catastrophes, a democratic
government is likely to act accordingly, either because it is responding to the public, or because
its officials suffer the same proclivities. Recall that if government actors are able to claim credit
for acting, or if they would be blamed for not acting, the likelihood of action bias increases (Patt
and Zeckhauser, 2000). We suspect that in many domains, government responses to emotionally
gripping problems with low probability of occurrence can be explained in this way. (See
Hamilton and Viscusi, 1999, for examples.) We also suspect that ill-considered, future, or
counterproductive reactions to past, present, or imminent risks derive in part from this
phenomenon.
In the environmental area, there has been an intense debate about whether the National
Environmental Policy Act requires agencies to discuss the worst-case scenario in environmental
impact statements. Environmental groups sought to ensure discussion of that scenario. They did
so in part to stimulate public concern, with the knowledge that the worst case might well have a
great deal of salience, however unlikely it might be. For its part, the government originally
required discussion of the worst case, but changed in its mind, with the apparent understanding
that people are too likely to overreact. Hence the current approach, upheld by the Supreme
Court,9 requires consideration of low-probability events, but only if they are not entirely remote
and speculative.

9

Robertson v. Mathow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 354-56 (1989).

9

At least at first glance, the current approach, and the Supreme Court’s decision, seem
entirely reasonable.10 (On some of the complexities here, see Sunstein, 2007.) If the chance that
the worst case will come to fruition is truly miniscule, it is plausible to say that it need not be
discussed in environmental impact statements, for the principal effect of the discussion would be
to activate fear, which is by hypothesis unwarranted by the facts. Worst-case analysis should not
apply when accumulated evidence shows that risks are quite low, as say with a major asteroid
hitting the Earth in the next year. Yet in the context of terrorism and other emotionally laden
hazards, people neglect the role of probability even when the evidence suggests that the
probability is quite small (Rothchild, 2001).
A good deal of legislation and regulation can be explained partly by reference to the
neglect of low probabilities when emotions are running high. Consider a few examples11:




In the aftermath of news report about emotionally gripping adverse health effects
allegedly caused by abandoned hazardous waste in Love Canal, the government
responded with an aggressive program for cleaning up abandoned hazardous waste cites,
without closely examining the probability that illness and other harm would actually
occur. In fact little was accomplished by early efforts to assure people of the low
probability of harm (Kuran and Sunstein, 1999). When the local health department
publicized controlled studies showing little evidence of adverse effects, the publicity did
not dampen concern, because the numbers “had no meaning” (Gibbs, 1998). In fact the
numbers seemed to aggravate fear: “One woman, divorced and with three sick children,
looked at the piece of paper with numbers and started crying hysterically: ‘No wonder my
children are sick. Am I going to die? What’s going to happen to my children?’” (id.).
Questions of this sort contributed to the enactment of new legislation to control
abandoned hazardous waste sites, legislation that did not embody careful consideration of
the probability of significant health or environmental benefits (Kuran and Sunstein,
1999). Even now, law and policy are affected by interest group pressures and public
alarm; the government has sometimes neglected the probability of significant harm in
making clean-up decisions (Hamilton and Viscusi, 1998).
During a highly publicized campaign designed to show a connection between Alar, a
pesticide, and cancer in children, the public demand for action was not much affected by
the EPA’s cautionary notes about the low probability of getting that disease (Wildavsky,
1995). The mere idea that children might die, as a result of apple consumption, had a
significant effect on behavior, with probabilistic information seeming not to reduce
people’s fears.

10

Jon Elster has explored the possibility that the worst-case analysis still should be employed as a maximin
approach when the probabilities of the various outcomes cannot be assessed (Elster, 1983). Dyed-in-the-wool
Bayesians, by contrast, would say that subjective probabilities should still be assessed and used.
11
In pointing to the role of probability neglect in these cases, we do not mean to reach any final conclusion on what
the government ought to have done in any of them.
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In the fall of 2001, vivid images of summer shark attacks created a public outcry about
new risks for ocean swimmers. This was so notwithstanding the exceedingly low
probability of a shark attack, and the absence of any reliable evidence of an increase in
shark attacks in the summer of 2001. Predictably, there was considerable discussion of
new legislation to control the problem, and eventually such legislation was enacted in
Florida. Public fears and anxieties were not impervious to the fact that the underlying risk
was miniscule; but the emotional response greatly exceeded the statistical risk.
The Three-Mile Island accident had significant adverse effects on nuclear power in the
United States for a long period, even though a blue ribbon panel concluded that the
expected number of lives lost was less than 1.

With respect to terrorism, the anthrax scare of October, 2001, which grew out of
exceedingly few incidents, provides dramatic evidence. Only four people died of the infection;
only about a dozen others fell ill. The probability of being infected was exceedingly low.
Nonetheless, anxiety proliferated; people focused their attention on the outcome rather than the
extremely low probability of the harm. The government responded accordingly, investing
significant resources in ensuring against anthrax infections. Private institutions reacted the same
way, asking people to take extraordinary care in opening the mail even though the statistical risks
were tiny.
In any particular case, such as anthrax, it is hard to say that precautions were excessive.
This could be hindsight bias. Maybe we just got lucky that there was not some large anthrax
conspiracy. But if we look across dozens of cases, we can observe a pattern in which salient but
extremely low probability risks are sometimes met with excessive responses. We should reiterate
our horse-clop point made earlier. If the preventive measures significantly assuage public fears,
perhaps they are worthwhile even if they reduce risk little if at all. But in some cases, we suspect
that to the contrary, some such measures stir rather than reduce fears by making the threat
salient. Think of posting a police officer at the doors of college buildings to protect against
campus shootings.
Arguably, the most severe recent example of overreaction to a risk threat is the follow-on
to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Public fears and anxieties helped to produce the
Iraq War, and to private and public costs that were orders of magnitude higher than the costs of
the attacks themselves. A full explanation of the Iraq War would of course have to include a
number of factors, but any such explanation would point, in part, to action bias and probability
neglect.
What might be done, recognizing the widespread tendency toward overreaction to
emotional risks? We do not have the space to answer fully, but with respect to regulatory policy,
institutional safeguards are the best way of ensuring against the harmful consequences of
probability neglect. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, within the Office of
Management and Budget, monitors agency action to ensure that it is directed against genuinely
significant problems. A general requirement of cost-benefit balancing, with careful attention to
the best estimates of relevant probabilities, should provide a check on regulations that deviate
11

substantially from objective evidence, providing far too little risk reduction for the resources
required. (Such requirements should also provide an impetus to preventive measures that the
public might not seek.) Reduction in public fears should count, but they are not a trump card. If
government wants to protect against hysterical precautions, analytic requirements and
institutional checks will provide a start.
5. Conclusion
Our central goal here has been to understand overreactions to fearsome risks. We have
suggested that when risks are vivid, people are likely to be insensitive to the probability of harm,
particularly when their emotions are activated.12 If terrible outcomes are easy to visualize, largescale changes in thought and behavior are to be expected, even if the statistical risks are
dramatically lower than those associated with many activities where the stakes are equivalent but
do not raise public concern. This claim about action bias helps explain public overreaction to
certain highly publicized, low-probability risks, including those posed by sniper attacks,
abandoned hazardous waste dumps, anthrax, and perhaps terrorism more generally. With
financial crises, as late 2008 made tragically clear, fears and anxieties, and the action bias they
induce, may dramatically magnify both the likelihood and size of a severe adverse outcome.
It follows that government regulation, affected as it is by the public demand for law, is
likely to stumble on the challenge of low probability harms as well. The government should not
swiftly capitulate if the public is demonstrating action bias and showing an excessive response to
a risk whose expected value is quite modest. A critical component of government response
should be information and education. But if public fear remains high, the government should
determine which measures can reduce most cost effectively, almost in the spirit of looking for
the best “fear placebo.” Valued attributes for such measures will be high visibility, low cost, and
perceived effectiveness. Reducing fear offers two major benefits: (1) Fear itself imposes
significant costs. (2) Both private and public responses in the face of fearsome risks are likely to
be far from rational. These observations lead to the difficult questions of how to monetize and
reduce public fear. The answers lie well beyond the current topic.
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In future work, we expect to examine the complementary concept of payoff neglect: when emotions run high the
size of potential losses will tend to be slighted. The emotion may be stimulated by anger due to the source of the
risk, or merely a vivid description of the risk itself, apart from its magnitude.
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